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Intelligibility	All	the	Way	Down:	Interpreting	Nagel’s	Mind	and	Cosmos.	
	
Thomas	 Nagel’s	 Mind	 and	 Cosmos	 is,	 to	 date,	 his	 most	 recent	 philosophical	
monograph.1	It	has	also	proved	to	be	his	most	controversial	as	Nagel	was	dragged	
into	America’s	culture	wars	over	the	respective	roles	to	be	played	in	intellectual	








The	 arguments	 of	Mind	 and	 Cosmos	 are	 clearly	 a	 continuation	 of	 some	 of	 the	
central	 themes	 of	 Nagel’s	 earlier	 work,	 particularly	 as	 expressed	 in	 the	 most	
comprehensive	 presentation	 of	 his	 philosophical	 outlook	 in	 The	 View	 from	
Nowhere2.	In	Mind	and	Cosmos	Nagel’s	argument	opens	with	the	claim	that	there	




strikingly,	 the	 ramifications	 of	 the	 problem	 are	 far	wider.	 Solving	 the	 problem	
involves	a	radical	change	in	our	self-understanding.	So	the	later	book	represents	
a	development	in	Nagel’s	thought	as	he	works	through	what	this	change	involves:		
























«	[A]	 comprehensive,	 speculative	 world	 picture	 that	 is	 reached	 by	
extrapolation	from	some	of	the	discoveries	of	biology,	chemistry	and	physics	
–	 a	 particular	 naturalistic	 Weltanschaaung	 that	 postulates	 a	 hierarchical	
relation	 among	 the	 subjects	 of	 those	 sciences,	 and	 the	 completeness	 in	




unified.	 Nor	 is	 he	 simply	 defining	 «	science	 »	 by	 iterating	 a	 list	 of	 disciplines	
whereby	 physical	 science	 is	 conjoined	 to	 all	 the	 other	 non-special	 and	 special	
sciences	 (however	 the	 line	 is	 drawn	between	 those	 two	 classes).	He	 is,	 rather,	
describing	 a	 philosophical	 view	 –	 hence	 the	 word	 «	speculative	»	 –	 that	
«	extrapolates	»	 from	 the	 success	 of	 the	 core	 sciences	 to	 a	 comprehensive	











refer	 to	Nagel’s	view	as	«	naturalism	»	 and	a	view	 that	he	 rejects	«	reductionist	
naturalism	»	 even	 if	 its	 proponents	 would	 reject	 that	 characterization	 of	 their	
view.		
Nagel	 further	 conjoins	 reductionist	 naturalism	 to	 an	 epistemological	
project	 envisioned	 by	 the	 Vienna	 Circle	 in	 the	 guise	 of	 the	 International	
Encyclopedia	of	Unified	Science.	That	project	is	the	unification	of	all	the	sciences	










the	 view	 that	 not	 only	 is	 our	 current	 understanding	 of	 the	 world	 fallible	 –	
something	most	philosophers	would	admit	–	but	 that	 future	conceptions	of	 the	




He	 believes	 that	 our	 current	 form	 of	 scientific	 understanding,	 then,	 is	
inherently	limited.	Nagel	does	not	mean	by	this	that,	given	our	current	methods,	
there	 are	 things	 we	 do	 not	 know	 –	 that	 is	 platitudinous.	 Rather,	 our	 current	
methods	have	necessary,	not	 contingent,	 limitations:	 there	are	 some	 things	we	
cannot	know	relative	to	our	current	understanding.	That	is,	however,	no	reason	to	
cut	 reality	 down	 to	 our	 size	 by	 drawing	 a	 principled	 connection	 between	 the	
knowable	and	the	real	that	ensures	that	the	latter	cannot	outstrip	the	former.	In	
The	 View	 from	 Nowhere,	 the	 physicalist,	 like	 the	 idealist,	 is	 accused	 of	 cutting	








In	 order	 to	 begin	 to	 make	 the	 case	 for	 an	 alternative	 to	 reductionist	
naturalism,	 Nagel	 proposes	 a	 transcendental	 argument	 that	 begins	 from	 an	




that	 our	 explanations	 have	hit	 bedrock	 is,	 for	Nagel,	 a	 failure	 and	ought	 to	 re-
interpreted	as	a	 counsel	 to	dig	deeper8.	There	 is	always	a	deeper	 intelligibility	
conferring	 explanation	 to	 be	 found;	 if	we	 cannot	 find	 one,	 that	 is	 a	 contingent	
limitation	on	our	(current)	abilities.	We	are	in	a	world	not	of	our	own	making	that	
exists	anyway;	 if	we	 fail	 to	make	sense	of	part	of	 it,	 that	 reflects	 the	necessary	
limitations	of	the	current	state	of	our	understanding.	
From	Nagel’s	 rationalist	 perspective,	 as	 expressed	 in	Mind	 and	 Cosmos,	
merely	identifying	the	cause	of	a	phenomenon	is	not	enough;	nor	are	correlations	
between	 distinct	 phenomena.	We	 seek	 explanations	 and	 to	 explain	 is	 to	 bring	









are	 fundamental	 features	 of	 the	 universe,	 not	 byproducts	 of	 contingent	



















matter	and	space-time	 in	an	account	of	what	there	 is13	».	 In	envisaging	such	an	
alternative	Nagel	argues	that	we	need	to	re-conceive	of	the	sciences	of	life	in	such	
a	way	that	they	can	be	integrated	into	a	reflective	account	of	the	world	and	our	












the	 form	of	mechanistic	 causal	 laws.	That	which	 the	Dutch	historian	of	 science	
Eduard	Jan	Dijksterhuis	called	the	«	mechanization	of	the	world	picture	 	»	has	been	







Mentality,	 or	 proto-mentality,	 must	 be	 built	 into	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	




non-materialist,	 explanation	 of	 how	 that	 could	 be	 possible	 that	 makes	 it	
intelligible	 that	 such	 an	 occurrence	 would	 be	 a	 probable	 development	 in	 the	






of	 a	 species	 in	 which	 we	 instantiate	 a	 capacity	 for	 reason	 that	 is	 reflectively	
applied	to	understanding	that	evolution	itself.	For	a	rationalist	like	Nagel,	reason	




and	 unmediated	 access	 to	 certain	 truth	 of	 reason	 that	 are	 plausibly	 to	 be	
interpreted	as	a	priori15.		
Furthermore,	we	can	reflect	on	the	operations	of	our	mind	itself	and	see	
that	 we	 face,	 to	 borrow	 David	 Chalmer’s	 expression,	 a	 «	hard	»	 problem	 of	
consciousness	 that	 suffices	 to	 show	the	 falsity	of	psycho-physical	 reductionism	
about	the	mental16.	Such	reductionism	neither	therapeutically	dissolves	the	hard	
problem;	 nor	 does	 it	 explain	 it	 away.	 Hence	 the	 persistent	 sense	 that	 the	
reductionist	 has	 redefined	 the	 problem	 of	 placing	 mental	 properties	 in	 the	









and	 seek	 a	 reflective	 account	 of	 our	place	 in	 the	world	 that	 is	 non-revisionary	
towards	 both.	 In	 that	 loose	 sense,	 of	 beginning	 from	 a	 minimally	 theorised	
conception	of	the	world	and	our	place	in	it,	Nagel	is	a	phenomenologist17.	
	 Mind	 and	 Cosmos	 is	 replete	 with	 subtle	 discussions	 of	 the	
phenomenological	 data	 to	 be	 derived	 from	 experience	 of	 consciousness,	
rationality	and	engagement	with	value.	Each	of	Nagel’s	separate	discussions	is	of	
interest	 in	 its	 own	 right.	 Individual	 chapters	 of	 the	 book	 are	 devoted	 to	






in	 this	book.	The	 inadequacy	of	 the	views	 that	he	criticises	 seems	 to	him	most	




















adequately	 answers	 the	 constitutive	 problem,	 Nagel	 doubts	 that	 it	 can	 be	 an	
answer	to	the	second,	historical,	question.		
«	[I]t	is	not	clear	that	this	kind	of	reductive	explanation	could	really	render	
the	 result	 intelligible	…	 The	 protopsychic	 properties	 of	 all	matter,	 on	 this	
view,	 are	 postulated	 solely	 because	 they	 are	 needed	 to	 explain	 the	
appearance	of	consciousness	at	high	levels	of	organic	complexity.	Apart	from	
that,	 nothing	 is	 known	about	 them:	 they	are	 completely	 indescribable	 and	










to	 him	 inescapable,	 and	 any	 constitutive	 account	 given	 in	 terms	 of	more	 basic	
elements	does	not	come	close	to	offering	a	satisfactory	explanation	of	rationality:	
as	he	notes		«	just	as	consciousness	cannot	be	explained	as	a	mere	extension	or	




this	 case,	 involves	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 reason	 responsiveness:	 Nagel	 claims	 of	
evaluative	 facts	 that	 «	it	 is	 through	 being	 recognized	 as	 reasons	 by	 a	 value-
sensitive	 agent	 that	 they	 affect	 behavior 22 ».	 This	 is	 an	 avowedly	 anti-
psychologistic	conception	of	explanation;	again,	a	legacy	of	Nagel’s	much	earlier	
work	in	The	Possibility	of	Altruism	where	psychological	explanation	is	constrained	




























a	 comprehensive	 answer	 to	 both	 of	 the	 questions	 that	 he	 tries	 to	 answer,	
constitutive	and	historical,	for	each	of	the	three	domains	of	mentality,	rationality	
and	 evaluation.	 Nagel	 believes	 that	 a	 relatively	 local	 philosophical	 problem	 –	
explaining	the	relation	between	the	mental	and	the	physical	–	has	this	dramatic	
consequence.	That	is	because	in	understanding	this	relation	between	the	mental	














Nexus	»,	where	he	 first	 speculated	 that	we	 are	on	 the	 verge	of	 discovering	 the	








of	 something	 both	 objectively	 physical	 from	 outside	 and	 subjectively	




Psychophysical	 Nexus	»	 made	 clear,	 uncovering	 this	 substrate	 that	 upwardly	
necessitates	both	its	mental	and	physical	aspects	would	be	an	empirical	discovery	
by	 the	 sciences	 of	 the	 mind;	 but	 there	 is	 philosophical	 insight	 in	 coming	 to	
understand	 the	 form	 that	 an	 intelligibility	 conferring	 explanation	 of	 the	
mental/physical	relation	has	to	take.	So	while	there	is	one	sense	in	which	it	is	up	



























	 However,	 Leopold	 Stubenberg	 has	 noted	 an	 important	 shift	 between	

































since	 this	necessary	connection	can’t	hold	directly	between	 the	physical	and	 the	
mental	 as	 we	 conceive	 them,	 it	 would	 require	 that	 the	 real	 character	 of	 these	









so	 in	 the	period	between	 the	publication	of	 these	 two	works	he	seems	 to	have	
revised	his	dual	aspect	theory	to	make	it	consistent	with	his	panpsychism:	on	the	




Nagel	 is	 concerned	 that	 panpsychism	 may	 do	 better	 as	 an	 explanation	 of	 the	
constitutive	nature	of	consciousness	than	as	an	account	of	its	historical	evolution.	
I	would	surmise	that	the	postulation	of	 teleological	 laws	 in	Mind	and	Cosmos	 is	
developed	precisely	to	address	this	subsidiary	problem.	Panpsychism	remains	as	











the	change	 is	 this:	mentality	does	not	manifest	 itself	everywhere.	Persons	have	
mental	 attributes;	 pet	 rocks	 do	 not	 –	 not	 really.	 However,	 in	 any	 case	 where	
mentality	does	not	manifest	itself,	the	same	underlying	substrate	must	be	involved	
(because	of	the	commitment	to	monism).	That	substrate,	 then,	either	manifests	
physicality	 and	 mentality	 (where	 mentality	 is	 instantiated)	 or	 physicality	 and	










suitably	 arranged	 it	 follows	 that	 this	 monism	 will	 be	 universal.	
Everything,	living	or	not,	is	constituted	from	elements	having	a	nature	that	
is	both	physical	and	nonphysical	–	that	is	capable	of	being	combined	into	














naturalistic	 option	 is	 a	 reductive	 naturalism.	 Reductive	 naturalism	 shapes	 the	
form	taken	by	the	theistic	«	intelligent	design	»	alternative;	absent	the	presumed	
sexism,	we	 can	 use	 J.	 L.	 Austin’s	 phrase	 that	 these	 two	positions	 “take	 in	 each	
other’s	washing”41.		Nagel’s	position	is,	in	that	sense,	even	more	radical	than	that	










theory	 of	 evolution	 in	 its	 current	 guise,	 to	 borrow	 arguments	 from	 religiously	
motivated	 proponents	 of	 intelligent	 design	 –	 even	 while	 he	 rejects	 their	
alternative	theistic	explanation	for	the	appearance	of	design.	(In	their	case,	that	
the	 appearance	 ought	 to	 be	 accepted	 at	 face	 value.)	 We	 need	 to	 explain	 how	
mentality	 could	 have	 evolved,	 given	 the	 truth	 of	 Nagel’s	 neutral	 monism,	 as	
opposed	to	simply	accepting	existing	conceptions	of	evolution	too	closely	tied,	he	
implies,	to	psychophysical	reductionism.		
	 As	 Nagel	 notes	 –	 anticipating	 the	 controversy	 his	 book	 would	 cause	 –	
criticizing	the	theory	of	evolution	is	viewed	as	both	«	politically	incorrect	»	as	well	




terms	 that	 have	 omitted	 the	 mind’s	 place	 in	 nature.	 Concomitantly,	 biological	
																																																								
41	«	[T]hese	two	terms,	‘sense	data’	and	‘material	things’,	live	by	taking	in	each	other’s	washing	–	




theory	has	restricted	 itself	 to	mechanistic	explanations	as	part	of	 this	unhappy	




long	 cosmological	 history,	 and	 its	 appearance	…	 casts	 its	 shadow	back	 over	 the	
entire	 process	 and	 the	 constituents	 and	 principles	 on	 which	 the	 process	
depends44.	»		
	
















and	 must	 rest	 on	 «	general	 assumptions	 »;	 that	 it	 runs	 contrary	 to	 common	
sense46.	
Critics	are	surely	right	to	find	this	conjunction	of	claims	about	the	current	


















a	burden	of	proof,	 at	 least	provisionally.	The	answer	 to	Nagel’s	 concern	would	












we	 have	 been	 successfully	 convinced	 that	 we	 need	 a	 new	 paradigm	 for	 the	
explanation	of	mind	and	value	that	we	are	forced	to	revise	our	assumptions	about	
evolutionary	theory	and	to	look	at	its	foundational	commitments	in	a	new	light.	
Nagel	may	 reasonably	 respond	 that	 it	 is	 not	 his	 job	 to	 re-write	 the	 life	






answers	 to	 the	 questions	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 life?	 Second,	 is	 a	 single	 mechanism	
adequate	to	explain	all	the	current	forms	that	life	takes?	
Nagel	believes	that	we	are	justified	in	beginning	from	our	well-grounded	







«	[T]he	 appearance	 of	 living	 organisms	 has	 eventually	 given	 rise	 to	
consciousnesss,	perception,	desire,	action	and	the	formation	of	both	beliefs	
and	intentions	on	the	basis	of	reasons.	If	all	this	has	a	natural	explanation,	the	
possibilities	were	 inherent	 in	 the	 universe	 long	 before	 there	was	 life,	 and	
inherent	 in	 early	 life	 long	 before	 the	 appearance	 of	 animals.	 A	 satisfying	







trans-physical	 alike.	What	 conception	 of	 law	would	make	 it	 intelligible	 how	















wider	 philosophical	 rationalism,	Nagel	 extends	 this	 defense	 to	 the	 truths	 of	
mathematics	and	ethics,	too.	If,	however,	we	accept	the	standard,	and	accept	










those	 conceptions	 exemplified	 by	 the	 sciences	 themselves.	 Philosophy	 and	 the	






that	 high	 level	 philosophical	 misconceptions	 may	 play	 a	 role	 in	 prematurely	
shutting	 down	 paths	 of	 enquiry	 that	 should	 have	 remained	 open.	 The	
mechanisation	 of	 the	 world-picture	 was	 undoubtedly	 a	 significant	 intellectual	
achievement,	but	if	philosophers	are	guilty	of	over-generalising	its	success,	then	
they	 are	prematurely	 foreclosing	on	 explanatory	options	 in	 the	 sciences	 of	 life	
without	sufficient	grounds	for	doing	so.	
	 The	basic	idea,	then,	is	that	we	need	a	general	conception	of	the	sciences	of	
life	 that	 does	 not	 reflect	 the	 false	 philosophical	 outlook	 of	 the	 reductionist	
materialist.	Nagel’s	specific	proposal,	as	I	have	noted,	depends	on	the	constraints	
placed	on	these	sciences	by	his	panpsychism.		




reach	 the	 point	 at	 which	 sophisticated	 biological	 organisms	 start	 to	 exhibit	
cognitive	 states	 –	 at	 some	 particular	 time	 in	 their	 evolutionary	 history.	 As	 a	
further,	complex	development	within	cognition	–	and	different	accounts	explain	




Nagel	 recapitulates,	 and	 endorses,	 his	 earlier	 critiques	 of	 emergentism	
interpreted	as	a	constitutive	account	of	what	makes	a	given	organism	conscious;	
«	it	 still	 seems	 like	magic	»50.	 	Emergence,	 for	Nagel,	 	 can	play	a	 limited	part	 in	
derivative	 explanations;	 his	 critique	 applies	 only	 its	 deployment	 in	 basic	
explanations.	However,	he	thinks	that	even	in	derivative	explanations	the	idea	of	
emergence	must	always	be	«	cashed	out	».	However,	when	we	do	cash	it	out	we	
see	 that	 it	 is	 «	analysed	 through	 the	 character	 and	 interactions	 of	 …	 more	
elementary	 components51	»	 	 and	 can	 see	 its	 inadequacy.	 Any	 such	 explanation	
rules	out	the	«	completely	new	»;	but	this	is	why	the	emergentist		cannot	explain	
consciousness 52 .	 Nagel	 can	 accept	 the	 uncontroversial	 claim	 of	 epistemic	
emergence	where	we	can	be	surprised	by	a	discovery	of	a	consequence	of	what	
we	know.	Metaphysical	emergence	is	categorical	different.	The	panpsychist	denies	












52	This	 objection	 is	 repeated	 in	 connection	 with	 a	 suggestion	 of	 Sharon	 Street’s	 proposal	 of	 a	




«	If	 evolutionary	 theory	 is	 a	 purely	 physical	 theory,	 then	 it	 might	 in	
principle	 provide	 the	 framework	 for	 a	 physical	 explanation	 of	 the	
appearance	 of	 behaviorally	 complex	 animal	 organisms	 with	 central	
nervous	 systems.	 But	 subjective	 consciousness,	 if	 it	 is	 not	 reducible	 to	
something	 physical,	 would	 not	 be	 part	 of	 this	 story;	 it	 would	 be	 left	





between	sophisticated	physical	 things	and	mental	 features:	 their	co-occurrence	






is	 because	 it	 is	 failing	 to	 explain	 part	 of	 it	 –	 its	 conscious,	mental,	 part.	 If	 the	





















Mind	 and	 Cosmos	 to	 include	 a	 novel	 conception	 of	 scientific	 law	 that	 could	
accommodate	that	explanatory	demand.	













are.	 If	 they	 can	 appeal	 only	 in	 their	 reductive,	 historicist,	 explanation	 of	 the	




«	The	 protopsychic	 properties	 of	 all	 matter	 …	 are	 postulated	 solely	
because	 they	are	needed	 to	explain	 the	appearance	of	 consciousness	at	
high	levels	of	organic	complexity.	Apart	from	that	nothing	is	known	about	




that	 panpsychism	 can	 really	 only	 answer	 his	 constitutive	 question	 about	
conscious	 mentality.	 Explanations	 of	 its	 historical	 emergence	 or	 parallel	
explanations	 of	 cognition	 or	 value	 are	 going	 to	 need	 to	 appeal	 to	 his	 novel	









theism	 and	 materialism;	 predictably	 enough,	 both	 postulate	 «	explanation	
stoppers	»	 that	 fail	 to	 meet	 the	 requirement	 posed	 by	 Nagel’s	 «	form	 of	 the	














it	 offers	 of	 our	 human	 capacities	 is	 insufficiently	 reassuring:	 «	evolutionary	
naturalism	provides	an	account	of	our	capacities	that	undermines	their	reliability,	
and	in	doing	so	undermines	itself63	.	»	
	Neither	 theism	 nor	 reductive	 naturalism	 (materialism)	 can,	 then,	 be	
anything	 other	 than	 a	 temporary	 stopping	 point	 for	 Nagel’s	 kind	 of	 objective	
idealist.	 The	 key	 elements	 Nagel	 isolates	 in	 both	 views	 is	 that	 they	 seek	
comprehensiveness,	 and	 must	 therefore	 include	 their	 own	 generation	 and	
acceptance.	They	must	be	«	reflexive	»	by	which	I	mean	that	both	views	have	to	
give	 an	 account	 of	 the	 social	 practices,	 norms	 and	 values	 in	 which	 the	 very	
enterprise	of	finding	out	the	fundamental	truth	about	reality	that	each	project	is	








agent	 in	 some	 ways	 like	 us,	 but	 in	 a	 fundamental	 way	 not	 –	 an	 agent	 whose	





undermining	–	Nagel	 claims	 that	 the	argument	ought	 to	be	 reversed:	our	most	
«	basic	 forms	 of	 thought	»	 are	 not	 candidates	 for	 being	 undermined	 by	
evolutionary	understanding:	
	
«	[I]t	 seems	 reasonable	 to	 run	 the	 test	 equally	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction:	
namely,	to	evaluate	hypotheses	about	the	universe	and	how	we	have	come	




we	 should	 not	 resile	 to	 quietism	 where	 that	 would	 mean	 delineating	 our	
conceptual	 scheme	 «	from	 within	»	 and	 noting	 differences	 between	 different	
forms	 of	 representation	without	 investigating	 issues	 of	 explanatory	 priority66 .	
Because	 reality	 is	 unitary,	 all	 our	 representations	 –	 of	 different	 degrees	 of	
«	perspectivalness	»	–	have	to	be	mutually	adjusted	and	reconciled	to	be	placed	in	


















These	 facts	 are	 as	 they	 are;	 Nagel	 is	 convinced	 that	 neither	 reductionist	
materialism,	nor	theism,	offer	any	credible	explanation	for	them.	Like	Ryle,	in	his	
rejection	of	 the	 ghost	 in	 the	machine,	Nagel	 is	 aware	of	 how	 these	 two	 flawed	
conceptions	–	one	of	mentality	and	the	other	of	matter	–	work	in	tandem	to	make	










	 First,	 Nagel’s	 defense	 of	 «	common	 sense	».	 Peter	 Godfrey-Smith’s	
response,	in	a	fair-minded	review,	is	the	most	forthright:	«	this	is	one	area	in	which	




of	 common	 sense	 against	 the	 truth	 of	 a	 theory;	 he	 is,	 rather,	 vindicating	 the	









70	P.	Godfrey-Smith,	 «	Not	 Sufficiently	Reassuring:	 review	of	Nagel’s	Mind	and	Cosmos	»	London	
Review	of	Books,	vol.	35,	no.	2,	pp.	20–21.	
Nagel	 is	 avowedly	 a	 rationalist	 and	 has	 been	 since	 The	 Possibility	 of	






the	 scientist?	 Again,	 that	 is	 not	 Nagel’s	 view:	 reductionist	 naturalism	 is	
extrapolated	 from	the	actual	 results	of	 the	sciences	and	 is	not	 itself	a	scientific	
view.	 Conversely,	 the	 philosophical	 question	 of	 whether	 there	 are	 irreducibly	
teleological	 forms	 of	 causation	 has	 not	 been	 answered	 solely	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 a	
mechanistic	 world-picture	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 as	 John	 Hawthorne	 and	
Daniel	Nolan	point	out	in	a	paper	to	which	Nagel	refers	approvingly72.	
If	the	question	had	been	settled	in	this	way,	then	at	least	we	are	owed	an	
account	of	 the	empirical	content	of	 the	theory	and	the	process	by	which	 it	was	
refuted.	Yet,	Hawthorne	and	Nolan	note	that	«	the	relation	of	 the	hypothesis	of	





























by	 its	 comprehensiveness.	 The	 critic	may	 urge	 that	we	 ought,	 case	 by	 case,	 to	





Lewis	 seems	 also	 to	 believe	 that	 his	 overall	 view	 –	 whatever	 its	 intrinsic	
plausibility	 –	 gains	 credibility	 from	 its	 comprehensive	 coverage	 of	 disparate	
problems.	
Most	charitably,	Nagel	is	not	telling	the	scientist	in	the	life	sciences	what	to	
do	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 her	 discipline,	 simply	 freeing	 up	 that	 practice	 from	 false	
assumptions	imposed	by	other	philosophers	–	not	scientists:	
«	Philosophy	cannot	generate	such	explanations;	it	can	only	point	out	the	




be	 kept	 open.	 This	 is	 a	 claim	 at	 a	 high	 level	 of	 generality;	 I	 have	 heard	 the	















in	 his	 insightful	 review	 of	 the	 book.	 Nagel	 postulates	 irreducibly	 teleological	
developmental	laws	to	explain	why	conscious	mentality	(and	rationality,	and	an	
inner	nisus	towards	value)	historically	developed	in	a	way	that	makes	them	more	









came	 about.	 The	 improbability	 has	 been	 declining	 rapidly	 for	 the	 last	 few	





Perhaps	 we	 should	 view	 the	 developmental	 process	 as	 involving	 a	 series	 of	

























to	 further	 arguments	 –	 such	 as	 formulations	 of	 non-standard	 versions	 of	
physicalism	 of	 the	 kind	 Stoljar	 develops.	 If	 no	 one	 remains	 committed	 to	 the	
epistemological	 project	 of	 unity	 represented	 by	 the	 Encyclopedia	 of	 Unified	
Science,	or	 to	psycho-physical	 reductionism,	 then	 from	Nagel’s	perspective	 that	
can	only	be	good	news.	In	fact,	 it	seems	to	me	that	he	is	right	to	identify	«	bald	




I	 think	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 describe	 the	 critical	 reception	 of	 Nagel’s	 book	 as	














grounds	 for	 taking	some	of	 these	 laws	to	be	actual.	 It	 is	not	his	 job	to	discover	
them,	but	to	enrich	the	intellectual	possibilities	of	those	working	in	the	sciences	





panpsychism	with	Galen	Strawson78.	Neutral	monism,	 in	 its	Russellian	guise,	 is	
currently	 undergoing	 a	 resurgence79 .	 Nagel’s	 sin,	 it	 seems,	 was	 to	 attempt	 to	
weave	 these	 views	 together	 in	 a	 single	 synthesis	 and	 then	 derive	 implications	
from	them	for	the	life	sciences	that	led	to	his	critique	of	the	theory	of	evolution.	It	
is	the	latter	that	has	earned	him	the	hostility	of	several	of	his	reviewers.	



















is	 keeping	 bad	 company. 81 	But	 it	 can	 hardly	 be	 a	 constraint	 on	 a	 work	 of	



































epistemic	 basis	 than	 the	 sciences,	 namely	 philosophy,	 this	 would	 seem	 to	 be	
methodologically	 sound	 advice	 pertinent	 to	 the	 present	 case.	 Speculative	
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